Chester Crocker and the Southern African Border War, 1981-1989

Between 1981 and 1989, United States Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker pursued a highly controversial ‘linkage’ strategy that aimed to secure an end to the universally condemned South African occupation of Namibia by offering as a prerequisite a US demand for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. This policy was heavily influenced by the Reagan administration's Cold War objectives, and was derided by critics as granting an ineffectual and unwarranted concession to Pretoria that delayed Namibian independence. Although the peace agreement ultimately signed in 1989 largely followed Crocker's plan, most of the relatively few analyses to subsequently revisit linkage have continued to deny the importance of Crocker's diplomacy in bringing about a regional settlement, while others have supported his policies without devoting sufficient attention to the role of external factors in determining the eventual outcome. Both supporters and detractors of Crocker's policy have maintained an excessive focus on his approach towards South Africa, to the virtual exclusion of the important role that his policies towards Angola played in influencing his regional peace initiative. Using published sources, documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and interviews, this article challenges the assumptions that have previously guided academic analysis of Crocker's regional policies.