D.R. Congo: Explaining peace building failures, 2003-2006

As a corrective to the emphasis on national and international reconciliation during peace building processes, I develop here a conceptual analysis of the dynamics of violence during the transition from war to peace and democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 2003 and 2006. I locate the sources, at the local, national, and regional levels, of continued local violence during this transition. Through an analysis of the situation in the provinces of North Kivu and North Katanga, I illustrate how local dynamics interacted with the national and regional dimensions of the conflict. I demonstrate that, after a national and regional settlement was reached, some local conflicts over land and political power increasingly became self-sustaining, autonomous, and disconnected from the national and regional tracks. Thus, peace building action was required not only at the national and regional levels but also locally. A year after the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo officially ended on 30 June 2003, more than one thousand civilians continued to die every day. Most of the deaths were cased by disease and malnutrition and could have been prevented if outbursts of violence had not impeded access to humanitarian aid, especially in the east (International Rescue Committee, 2004). In April 2004, for example, the United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs wrote the following situation report: The security situation was the most worrying this month in North-Kivu, south-Kivu and Katanga Provinces in the Eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo... As a consequence of the fighting and increased tension in these three regions, approximately 30-35,000 people were estimated displaced over the course of this month. In addition to the displacement, (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) continued to