Reducing the Treat of Biological Weapon: NGO Committee of Disarmament, Peace and Security in Cooperation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs

What follows are excerpts from the edited transcripts or reports of four panel discussions sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security in cooperation with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs during 2000-2003. Thinking about the best way to reduce the threat of biological and toxin weapons has changed over this time period in large part in reaction to a shift in the position of the United States. The most recent panel discussion focused on what could be done now, not with how to strengthen the treaty. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC, also referred to as the Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC) came into effect in 1972. Negotiation of the treaty was initiated by the Nixon Administration and had concluded that biological weapons had no military utility and should be banned. The treaty, however, has no verification provisions, and for seven years efforts were made by countries to develop a Protocol to address this deficiency under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Tibor Toth of Hungary. In November 2001, Member States of the BWC met in Geneva with the hope of concluding the Protocol. However, last July, the Bush Administration had rejected the Chairman’s draft of the Protocol, and also declared that it could not be repaired to meet US acceptance. The Protocol called for establishment of an international organization to conduct routine inspections to verify compliance and included a provision for challenge inspections at short notice when cheating on the BWC was suspected. The Member States of the BTWC suspended the Review Conference and decided to meet again before the end of 2002 with the hope initially of coming to some agreement on the Protocol, rather than abandoning the effort as the US had desired. With the use of anthrax in the US in the fall of 2001 and suspicions that several countries have or are developing biological weapons, this issue has become even more important. Prior to the resumed Fifth Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference held November 10-15, 2002, Ambassador Toth drafted and circulated a proposal for a final declaration which he presented at the opening of the Conference. The draft was based on US proposals for national rather than international actions. The Conference then adjourned for regional meetings. The US was persuaded by the Western Group to support the proposal, and did so provided that no changes were made. The NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) raised a series of questions about the inadequacy of the proposal and its ambiguities, but was persuaded to agree, on condition that they could make a statement for inclusion in the Final Declaration. The Western Group also inserted a statement. The proposal was adopted by consensus. The Decision left in limbo further discussion of how to strengthen the Convention multilaterally, but was preferable to no further multilateral meetings until 2006.