Kwacha: The Violence of Money in Malawi's Politics, 1954-2004. pp.525 - 544.

One of the strongest limiting factors in the transition to participatory democracy in Malawi is the failyre of independent and sustainable cadres of young politicians to emerge. This is caused by the role that money, genered via the informal economy, plays in Malawian politics.This money is channelled into politics via achikulire (neo-parerimonial patrons or 'big men'), usually without parti accountability.This factor may be more critical in retarding the development of participatory democracy than social structure, ethnicity, religion, donors or other aspects of political dynamics. The socio-economic impediments to achieving participatory democracy tend to be viewed through economic theories appropriate to contexts more westernised than Malawi. I will argue that some of the e"disorder' in Africa observed by Chabal and Daloz (1999) is actually a function of the unresolved historical dynamic between two economic sectors: the formal cash (colonial European and postcolonial black elite) sector and the 'informal' non-cash (rural/peasantry) sector. By controlling this dynamic, neo-patrimonial politicians can minimise ethnic, social, political and constitutional barriers to their hold on power. Successful Malawian politicians have a triple-edge relationship with the peasants are their masters at election time, subjects at most times and business clients at harvest. This article will analyse the formation of new patron-client relationships during the 1991-1994 political transition and show how these were successesfully exploited by United Democratic Front achikulire. In 2004, money sourced through achikulire enabled Bakili Muluzi tro impose his designated successor on a relucant party and nation, leading to the 2004-2005 constitutional crises.