Post-conflict Reconstruction and the Resurgence of ‘Resolved’ Territorial Conflicts: Examining the DRC Peace Process

Beyond the rhetoric of traditional causes of conflicts which intermittently are also at the root cause of African territorial civil conflicts, this article examines why conflict resurges in states where conflict has previously been resolved. From the perspective of two major theoretical frameworks in International Relations: Liberalism and Realism, this article argues that mechanisms for conflict resolution are often short-term and often not home-groomed to accommodate the needs of indigenes emanating from and who are victims of civil war. Liberals argue that this is primarily a failure of cooperation between external and internal actors or stakeholders in the peace process. To them, this lack of cooperation generates economic problems and creates mistrust which is the embryo for conflict resurgence. In contrast, the Realist framework emphasises that conflict resolution fails as a result of a number of factors. The conflict may not have been ripe to be resolved or may have degenerated beyond the ‘ripemoment’ because the practical meaning of intervention and peacekeeping revealed large gaps between scholars as to how the process should be driven and how the reconstruction could be structured to give indigenes more ownership without prejudice to sustainable peace. Against this background and given the depth of antagonism between the DRC government and MONUC[i] on the one hand and rebel movements on the other, the economic wealth of the Congo has failed to generate support for the peace process. Instead, it increased friction and placed additional political obstacles in the way of compromise, thus suggesting that the key to peace is yet to be found. Since the international community has twice resorted to sending peacekeepers to stabilise the Congo, the article also examines the potency of peacekeeping as a vehicle for conflict resolution. It argues that while structural challenges like inadequate resources, ill-equipped personnel and lack of a clearly defined vision and strategy have in some circles been argued to be the cause of the prolonged Congolese conflict, the design and conceptualisation of peacekeeping as a foreign regiment is responsible for the cyclical conflicts. In examining the role of MONUC and other interveners in the Congolese peace process, the article engages a conceptual thesis which seeks to clarify the difference between peacekeeping as a mediator, meddler and interventionist in African civil conflicts. This clarification will inform conceptual thinking on the potency of peacekeeping as a vehicle for the resolution of civil conflicts while making a case for indigenes’ ownership of the peace/nation building process.