Sharia Reforms and Power Maintenance

This paper investigates the reasons why the Moroccan King Mohammed VI, unlike his father, King Hassan II, and the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has shown a strong reformist commitment to revise the Family Code and eventually launched substantive changes. I argue that those reasons must be found in the opportunities and/or risks for preserving the authoritarian status quo that were created by the specific political context in which the regimes operated. In making this argument I consider the inter-relation of two main political contextual factors as the determinants of the regime’s commitment to reform on Shari’a-based issues: first, the position of Islamist parties and other key political parties – being included or excluded – within the formal political space; second, the relationships-cooperative or uncooperative – that Islamists have with the other political actors. The inclusion of Islamists within the formal political space and the arising of cooperative relationships between them and the other opposition parties allowed Mohammed VI to use the family law reforms as a ‘divide and rule’ strategy to weaken the opposition bloc. The political context did not provide similar incentives to Hassan II or to Bouteflika, thus contributing to their lack of commitment to reform and reducing the impact of the changes enacted. A crucial implication arises from the analysis: the closer the linkage between reforms of Shari’a and the opportunity for the regimes to maintain their power, the more they will have an interest in pushing for substantive changes. Otherwise reforms, if any, will be fated to be at most incremental and cosmetic.