'Layered Response' to an African Conflict or Muddling through in Sierra Leone?

The aim of this essay is to outline the evolution of crisis and response in Sierra Leone as a case study in incrementalism and confusion on the use of force in peace missions. The case of ‘lean peacekeeping’ in Sierra Leone also illustrates that the Brahimi Report is no panacea for effectiveness in non-benign peace support environments. Sierra Leone has been the victim of international neglect, as evidenced by the uneven and unusual responses to its civil war. When the UN finally authorised a multinational intervention force, it deployed slowly, and soon proved to be inept. The mission publicly fell apart with thousands of UN troops in the country. In their attempts to bolster the fragile peace in Sierra Leone, both the UK and the US continued to work outside the UN framework. From a conceptual standpoint, the problem is not so much one of potential failure, but of success. If this intervention recipe does somehow succeed in creating stability and peace, how could it ever be replicated in other trouble spots? And how does it fit into the new blueprint for effective UN peace operations?