Risk, Taxpayers, and the Role of Government in Project Finance

December 1996 A perennial question has been the relative cost of public and private finance for investment projects in infrastructure. Klein argues that the apparent cheapness of sovereign funds stems from taxpayers' not being remunerated for the contingent liability they effectively assume. So the proper role for government is to reduce the cost of risk-bearing for all projects by providing a stable and efficient policy framework. Klein concludes that government, through the tax system, cannot really do better than private financial markets at funding infrastructure projects. All the financial advantages of sovereign finance are due purely to coercive powers and are of no social value. Under government finance the taxpayers would bear a contingent liability that, if properly remunerated, would wipe out any cost advantage of sovereign borrowing. Governments should then refrain from investing in projects or firms, whether with equity or with debt. They should not cover commercial risks. In particular, one cannot argue that there is a tradeoff between the low cost of government finance and private efficiency. Private markets will do the best they can to tap low-cost funds while maintaining project discipline. They solve whatever tradeoff there is. The government cannot do better by raising funds. As a corollary, discount rates for private and public sector projects would not be expected to differ (contrary to standard practice). Arguing that the government cannot be expected to improve on the outcome of free financial markets is not to argue that all is the best in the best of all possible worlds and that there is no role for government. Private markets may not always find the best solutions. Market participants constantly search for better ways of trading risks. On average we could not expect governments to do better. More important, governments can si...