Social dilemmas and shame-based sanctions : Experimental results from rural Zimbabwe

Using two economic experiments I investigate how a sample of rural communities in Zimbabwe approach social dilemmas. When provided with an opportunity to impose sanctions in the context of a public goods game, fourteen out of eighteen communities achieved higher levels of cooperation. In thirteen communities the imposition of shame-based sanctions in the form of light-hearted criticism was observed. The resulting data revealed that both non-cooperators and cooperators were criticised;community members cared about what their neighbours thought of them and made adjustments to their behaviour accordingly;the overall pattern rather than individual experiences of criticism affected subsequent behaviour;those who made low contributions and witnessed the criticism of others who made similar contributions, made higher contributions subsequently, while those who experienced such criticism first-hand made significantly smaller adjustments to their behaviour;those who made high contributions and witnessed the criticism of others who made similar contributions, made lower contributions subsequently;and to the extent that an opportunity to criticize passed by unexploited subsequent levels of cooperation were reduced.